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Cowan: A Working Model for Jurisprudential Investigation: On the Lawyer

A WORKING MODEL FOR JURISPRUDENTIAL
INVESTIGATION: ON THE LAWYER AS AN
EMERGING FORCE IN MODERN

JURISPRUDENCE
THOMAS A. COWAN*

I am not sure what deep instinct prompted the editors of this
Review to suggest for study the subject of the Lawyer, an Emerging
Force in Modern Jurisprudence. My own instinctive reaction to the
notion is to ask bluntly, Is it so? After that I would be forced to add:
if it is so, then surely I am not the person to write on the subject.
For I know distressingly little of the ways of the practitioner. Unlike
the judge or even the legislator, the practitioner is not called upon
to give a reasoned running account of his professional doings. I do
not mean that an investigation of the life work of the practicing
lawyer could not be undertaken. Still less do I mean to imply that
this potent force in the making of the living law should not be
investigated. It is hard to imagine a more absorbing problem for the
legal scholar than a study of what is taking place at the front lines
in the struggle between law and the human propensity for conflict.
I mean rather that this basic cumulative account has not yet been
given and therefore that jurisprudence, however sympathetic it may
be to the idea that the social matrix out of which law arises is the
main focus of twentieth century jurisprudence, has practically nothing to theorize about.
At this point common sense should dictate a stop to speculation
until some data to speculate upon are in. But if the legal philosopher
possessed that modicum of common sense he would soon find himself
without much to do in most areas of the law, since all appears
unsettled; basic legal conception is subject to no learned consensus
and the very meaning and nature of law is still very much in dispute.
Perhaps then there is some point in resorting to the philosopher's
inevitable reaction to a situation that catches his interest: to start
asking questions about it. For example, take the question of the
lawyer as an emerging force in modem jurisprudence. How would
one go about finding the answer to the question? Philosophic temperaments other than mine might find other questions more congenial. Such as, What is a lawyer? What is a jurisprudential force?
What is modern jurisprudence? What is jurisprudence itself? But I
prefer to assume that the answers to these questions can be held in
abeyance (their turn will undoubtedly come) while I direct attention
*Professor of Law, Rutgers University.
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to the question I want raised, namely, Is the Lawyer really an Emerging Force in Modern Jurisprudence?
I am well aware that this question belongs to that large class
of questions which if pursued long enough are likely to be answered
in the affirmative. For of course the prime movers in shaping the
day by day progress of the law, that is to say, the lawyers, are undoubtedly also in some sense the prime shapers of jurisprudence.
Otherwise we could be sure that jurisprudence would have no real
connection with its fundamental base, the living law. Hence, to
raise the question is to indicate an affirmative answer just in the
nature of the case. But this is not enough. It may turn out to be
nothing more than the homely wisdom that would point out that
on similar and even more philosophical grounds one could undertake
to look at People as an Emerging Force in Modern Jurisprudence.
That People are a force in modem jurisprudence goes without saying,
so we shall say nothing about it. That Lawyers are more explicitly
a force in modem jurisprudence is by virtue of their preoccupation
with the law merely a more explicit truism. But to ask whether
Lawyers are an Emerging Force is no tautology. In fact, it is a matter
of investigating a possible change in the fundamental role of an
ancient highly organized profession deeply set in its own ways. If
Lawyers are "emerging" in any important way, we should know about
it; and if they are emerging as a new and explicit force in the shaping
of jurisprudence, this is surely a prime concern of the jurisprudentialists.
For I believe that the word "emerge," which turns out to be the
critical term for us, is well worth pondering. It immediately raises
an important question of methodology for all about to undertake
study or speculation on the emergence in question. Namely, should
one study the emerging lawyer in the way in which one studies a
butterfly emerging from a cocoon, that is, without asking the butterfly what it is up to, but just observing what it does whether in its
natural environment or in the altered environment of a laboratory
or test field? To take it as a sample of behavior and to report its
reactions to its environment? Such an enterprise yields a certain
measure of information. And at present there is a growing interest
in observing the lawyer as a member of a professional entity and in
attempting to generalize on his reaction to his environment. This
way could be called the scientific, or rather, considering the present
state of the art, the protoscientific way. Eventually one might suppose
that an "answer" could begin to gather shape, so that one could say
"Yes, the lawyer is an emerging force in modem jurisprudence, or no
he is not."
Another method of procedure would lead not to an answer, but
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to a response. Let me explain. Suppose one were to stop a busy
lawyer and say, "Are you an emerging force in modern jurisprudence?"; he might reply, "Of course." The proper thing to say to him
then is, I suppose, "Prove it." This would immediately give him a
client (himself), and a cause, namely, to prove that his client (now
an entire profession) is an emerging force in modern jurisprudence.
Without doing more, one has already advanced the affirmative response to our question by a small but definite step. It has an advocate
and he has a cause. Multiply this process by an indefinitely large
factor and soon one might begin to find a large affirmative response
emerging. For unlike the method of observation which usually supposes that the object undergoing scrutiny is left unchanged, the
other way aims to see whether the affirmative hypothesis can be substantiated by careful nurturing. The method of observation becomes
a program of action, and it may expect to be called upon to justify
itself sooner or later.
Is it possible that without becoming a program of action, which
in the nature of things must appear confident that it knows what
it is about, our program may be and remain a program of inquiry
without becoming an alleged unbiased, unprejudiced investigation
of the lawyer as a thing; in this case, a thing emerging as a force
in jurisprudence? I think it is possible. So let us be clear about
what we intend to do. We intend to try to investigate a method
for answering the question whether and if so in what way the lawyer
is emerging as a force in modern jurisprudence. We shall not follow
the protocol of the scientist, the behavioral scientist. On the other
hand, we shall not stay that we will be unscientific or even nonscientific. It may turn out that, stubborn as we are, we shall insist that
our inquiry is to be properly and appropriately called scientific,
since it is designed to yield us more knowledge than the other ways
of investigation which purport to be scientific.
We could begin our inquiry in a rather unusual way. Instead of
trying to imagine what our subjects, the lawyers, are like, suppose
we ask ourselves what we, the investigators, are like. Our model, we
might say, unlike that of the so-called scientist, gives first precedence
to the kind of creature the investigator is, not the kind of creature
he thinks he is investigating. The usual model of an experimental
scientific sort sets down the investigator's presuppositions, his hypotheses, his method of gathering data and his scheme for drawing inferences from his results. We will not use this model for two reasons.
First, we are philosophers and such models customarily leave out
philosophy. And second, it is our conviction that these models aren't
any good anyway for investigating the kind of matters we want to be
informed about. Just to begin with, our "objects" change in extreme-
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ly lively fashion during the inquiry (this is not so unusual in this day
of nuclear physics whose particles cannot be investigated without
being indeterminately perturbed). More than this, they directly
affect us as we investigate them, we in turn affect them, they affect
us again and so on in a dialogue that none of the scientific models
one knows anything about would be able to tolerate for a moment.
Our scientific "objects" are not "subjects" either, in any meaningful
sense. They are co-investigators, and more important to our enterprise than we are; they are authoritative, for we depend upon what
they do and say for what we want to know. They are opinionated,
informed and decisive - they make the ultimate decisions. So I
believe that the ordinary behavioral science models which recognize
in their "subjects" none of these sovereign characters are of little
use to us. We must make up our own models, with the humility
that the nature of our enterprise forces us to cultivate.
We propose in short to construct a scientific model of a dialogue
on the subject of jurisprudence. Our Dialogue Model would not only
be expected to answer the question, Is the lawyer an emerging force
in modem jurisprudence? The very use of the model would itself
be jurisprudence.
THE

ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL

A list of the Jurisprudential Biases of the investigator
A detailed account of the Purposes of the investigation
A Schedule of Questions to be asked
A Recording of the Responses, replies, replications, and
so forth
5. A Summing up of changes in the investigator: what he
thinks he has learned and how this information has
affected him
6. An estimate of changes in the subject matter of the investigator
7. The feasibility of the program as a model for general
investigation into complex aspects of human conduct and
specifically as a jurisprudential tool.
1.
2.
3.
4.

With this list before us it becomes apparent that we are attempting to sketch the outlines of a model to guide us in the investigation
of questions such as, Are lawyers now emerging as a force in jurisprudence? Can we suppose that this model may be used in the way
the behavioral scientist uses a polling model, for example? Hardly.
One could not expect that an investigator trained only a short while
in the use of the polling model could be turned loose to collect
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what has been perhaps inadvertently though accurately called "data,"
that is, mere "givens," reactions. It demands too much self-knowledge
on the part of the investigator, too much knowledge of what the
purposes of the investigation are; and finally, altogether too uncomfortable a demand that he report what happened to him in the investigation.
It will not escape attention that these extraordinary burdens we
are putting upon our investigator are at the same time a criticism
of much of what passes for social science today. Still, that is not our
purpose. Our aim is to frame our own model, designed for our own
use and as such perhaps not transferable to other investigations
without substantial change.
1. JurisprudentialBiases
Our jurisprudential investigator will almost certainly have bias in
one of the three following directions:
A. He will believe that there is a substance common to all humanity whose nature it is the business of jurisprudence to discover
and whose purpose it is the function of law to serve; or
B. He will believe that this assumption is impertinent and that
it is incumbent upon one who would study the nature of law
or any of its manifestations to stay within the confines of
authoritative legal materials. The question of what are the
bounds of this area is of course pertinent to this inquiry; or
C. He will try to synthesize these points of view.
The A's. The "common human substratum," taken by the A's
to be the ultimate legal substance has many forms. It is St. Paul's
law written in the hearts of all men; it is that part of God's eternal
law participated in by men and called natural law by the Christian
theologians. It may be love, but it is more likely to be reason, or
whatever else is taken to be the true mark of general human nature.
Those are the leading ideas of all the systems which go by the name
of natural law. They postulate a nature, usually a "higher" nature
for man, and tend to infer what is right (and lawful) for man to do
from that postulated ideal. These systems align themselves traditionally with religion and morality, looking for a religious base or perhaps a nonreligious moral base for law.
Differing radically from these but still looking for a common human substance as a base for law are the A's who try to find it in actually observable human conduct. Perhaps the common substance is
custom, the tendency of human beings to persist in ways of doing
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things when equally efficient alternatives exist or can be imagined.
Or the harsh human necessities are examined to see if they form a
structure sufficient to support the superstructure of the law. The
biological necessities, food, self- and species-preservation, shelter, war
may be made into a system that is supposed to give rise to law so
that one imagines that without law the life of man soon becomes
"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." Or man's fundamental
mode of exploiting or being exploited in class conflict may be taken
as the basis of all his ideologies including law, and the "suppression
of exploitation" (cruel paradox) give rise to cooperativeness. Law
and its harsh compulsion then wither away leaving only administration. The Marxian ethics finds the common human substance in
the mode of production, the vast uniformities in the ways in which
human needs get satisfied.
One might believe that law is embedded in man's biology, that
is, in his rooted instinctive tendency to react as, for example, against
certain patterns of injustice. The process may be identification with
the fate of the injured one, identification giving rise to an emotional
response which in turn triggers off somatic reactions that we recognize as "righteous" anger. Or, becoming "scientific" one might seek
merely for empirical generalizations with which to describe observed
uniformities in human action, reporting as dispassionately as possible
those uniformities which give rise to law and order.
We know that during many millennia, for western culture, which
has always been obsessed with the need to set mankind off sharply
from the rest of God's creatures, the stuff common to all members of
the genus homo sapiens has been taken to be Reason. Now surely
this is a vast conceit. But it has served our greatest thinkers as a base
upon which to found a system of law. I refer to the natural law.
Of course, natural law has had and still has as many varieties as there
are theories of the nature, the origin or the purpose of reason- and
more, since natural law (law conforming to the nature of man, universe or god) is by no means confined to the choice of reason as its
substantial base.
Preoccupation with a common stuff out of which law arises (as
distinct from the idea that law arises out of itself) takes, then, two
directions. Either one sees ethics or morality as the foundation of
law or one sees science, behavioral science, as the mode by which
the mysteries of law are to be unravelled.
The B's. We come now to the B's. For them, law arises out of
itself and stays pretty much in its own community. Law is a selfsufficient, self-contained system at the lowest aspects of casual human
interchange as well as at the highest reaches of jurisprudence. Every-
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thing human beings do is potentially law, but the point is that the
potentiality is legal. Else it is irrelevant to us. Law is an art: the legal
craft. Law is a science: the autonomous science of all sovereign
dispositions ordained to be executed through the institutions of government. And so on. In common law countries this study is apt to
be called Analytical Jurisprudence and in civil law countries Positivism.
Since it certainly would make a difference to the investigator of
the question whether or not lawyers are an emerging force in modern
jurisprudence that his, the investigator's, jurisprudential bias is or is
not in this direction, we must examine further what such a bias
consists of.
To begin with, why do we call the bias in favor of an autonomous
science of law Analytical Jurisprudence? What has the mood or sentiment in favor of "legal autonomy" got to do with Analysis? Are
people who like to draw a circle around a group of objects and say,
"Everything inside the circle is L, and everything outside the circle
is not-L," likely also to be people interested in Analysis? John Austin,
the founder of modern Anglo-American Analytical Jurisprudence,
began his celebrated lectures with the title, "The Province of Jurisprudence Determined." The significant words are Province and
Determined.
The preoccupation of the B's is with the law as a closed system.
Their instinctive action is to draw boundary lines around the activity
of law. They spend much time to determine the marks of law, what
is as distinguished from what is not Legal. So for them the first
problem of Jurisprudence is to look for necessary characters or definitions of law. This enterprise, which calls itself analysis, keeps right
on going after it defines or separates out law from nonlaw. It continues to classify. The various kinds of law are thus studied. Subdivision follows subdivision until one can subdivide no more. Then
the categories are closed and thereafter everything that purports to be
law must fit into the scheme or be discarded. This mode of procedure is easily recognized as the oldest form of Jurisprudence. It is
the way Roman law was analyzed and taught. All primitive lawmakers must attend closely to what they want to call law, a very
solemn and even dangerous matter.
All B's agree more or less that the most important aspect, mark,
or quality of law is its sovereign or imperative character. They are
very much impressed by the fact that all law purports to be enforcible
and usually go so far as to say that any formulation of a rule for
human behavior which does not carry with it a sanction by governmental authority is not law. They tend to regard as irrelevant other
contradictory characters of law, such as that only a tiny part of it
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is ever enforced in fact, or that a great deal of it is literally unenforcible, or that most of it doesn't need enforcement, since it is well
understood that most law is simply ignored or disregarded or not
even known. It is enough for the B's that all law can theoretically be
enforced, if anyone having certain rare characteristics can be found
sufficiently motivated to invoke the appropriate governmental apparatus, provided the governmental agency in question thinks the matter
is appropriate for enforcement. If one were to consider only two
species of law that the Federal Government spends so much time on
the lesson would become clear. Congress taxes and spends. Its spending laws are not enforcible in any conceivably useful sense of the
term. Its tax laws are, and painfully so. A purist B might be led
to say that tax is law, but spending is not. But as the activities of
the service state grow, the clearer law is seen to be administration
and not enforcement. And in the areas where enforcement is still
prominent, notably in the criminal law, enforcement takes on the
aura of a civil war between those who support the police functions
of the modem state and those virtually in armed rebellion against it.
In a situation so fluid as that of modern law "enforcement," those
whose temperament leads them to seek the sovereign marks of law,
so that the process of rational analysis may proceed, are increasingly
hard put to find any such distinguishing characteristics. Hence, the
gap between ad hoc legal determinations of an increasingly complex
nature on the one hand and overall analytical generalizations necessary to an adequate science of law on the other grows apace. The
legal analyst is driven further and further down the chain or hierarchy
of legal processes until he is forced to settle for work in the ancient
bedrock of basic legal subsystems such as tort, contract, property,
and procedure, which are brought up to date by a process of shallow
analogy in such new rubrics as labor law and unfair competition,
negotiation and arbitration, estate and urban planning, judicial
administration and legal process. It is not unfair to say that the
jurisprudentialist B's in common law countries have not gotten much
above the level of generalization represented by these newer analogues of very old processes of the law.
The vast wealth of analytical power tied up in modern analytical
philosophy, modem logic, decision theory and system science is, despite a few very notable exceptions, simply not available for use in
legal theorizing. This means that a B-minded investigator intent on
engaging in a dialogue with "the modern lawyer" on the question
of the lawyer's emergence as a force in modem jurisprudence would
find himself severely constrained, so severely indeed that it is my
impression that he would be very apt to conclude that the job was
not attractive enough to be worth undertaking.
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I should conclude that the B's would have to upgrade the methods
of legal analysis very drastically before they could profitably undertake the kind of investigation we have been talking about here with
anything like the degree of sophistication that modern science, especially physical science, takes to the problems it investigates. Logic,
mathematics, decision theory and system science are just not in usable
shape at present for the jurisprudentialist, or indeed for that matter,
for the behavioral scientist.
On the other hand, the homely virtues of old-fashioned case
analysis, the process which ushered in western culture in the practices
of the western religions and which was the mainstay of Roman law,
are still being practiced by myriads of members of the legal profession
all over the world. It is in this area of living law that the jurisprudential B's would have to conduct their investigations, trying to
find out how much of this activity they would call "law," how much
"jurisprudence," and how much "practitioner jurisprudence." They
could note, for example, that the body of law known as "conflicts"
governs only a very tiny fraction of the vast amount of intercourse
that goes on among the citizens of different political states, transactions which presumably give rise to the normal amount of real
conflict to be expected of such human interaction. They might ask
themselves how much of the alternative modes for resolving such
conflict they would be willing to call law. And if these alternative
modes are largely the result of efforts of practitioners and if they
constitute genuine departures from traditional legal modes of conflict
resolution, then it would be in order to ask whether, taken as a
whole, the new modes of international conflict resolution do not
represent the creation of new systems of lawmaking, which in turn
give the jurisprudentialist a new problem to work on, in deciding
upon ways and means for incorporating these new systems in the body
of traditional lawmaking. And if this is true for international conflicts, it is also true for many other areas of activity which constitute
the daily work of the practitioner of law. So there is much to be
done by our legal analytical jurisprudentialist in a dialogue with a
real or simulated practitioner. But little of it could get under way
unless the investigator both knows that he is a B and wants to undertake B-like investigations, despite their obvious limitations.
The C's. I am not sure that the C's even exist. Therefore it becomes necessary to create them. C's are synthesizers, and may expect
to be regarded with suspicion not only by A's and B's alike but also
by all reasonable people. For although C's try to avoid the defects of
A's and B's and to consolidate only their virtues, they often end up
in fact with having consolidated only defects. The strength of the
A's is in their instructive hold on what truly matters in every legal
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disposition: the notion of justice, right reason, custom, the mode of
production, and the like. Their weakness is their inability to order
their intuitions into a system. Conversely, the B's instinct is for order,
but their weakness is that they are willing to sacrifice everything for
order-ability, discarding what does not lend itself to neat analysis and
reasonably rational ordering. The A's danger is moral sentimentality.
They tend to offend the B's with their romantic unconcern for scientific rigor and clear thinking. The B's, on the other hand, offend with
their apparent disregard for human feeling and sensibility. Their
logic cuts like a knife and kills what it dissects. The C's, I am intimating, are designed to avoid these defects. They attempt the almost
impossible task of reconciling thought and feeling. They would
humanize science and scientize the humanist. Can this be done, even
in contemplation?
So far I have suggested that it cannot be done if the jurisprudential investigator does not know his own jurisprudential bias, that
is to say, does not know whether and to what extent he is an A, a B, or
a C. I do make the egregiously unproved assumption that if he does
know these things, he can incorporate them in his jurisprudential
dialogue model with fortunate results. I should not like to have to
defend this assumption against spirited opposition and so must be
content to let it stand undefended.
I take it that the ideal "C" I am talking about would be no less
humanist than scientist in his pursuit of knowledge. That is to say
that he would reject, on grounds both moral and scientific, any piece
of data that he came by in ways that would seem to him to be
suspect from the point of view of decent respect for the intellectual
and moral integrity of his so-called subjects. This means that he
could gather data only from an Equal. I mean by this that data obtained in any other way is too contaminated for use in Jurisprudence, for I
consider that the legal ideal of Equality or better still what Stammler
called Respect is not merely a tenet of our "minimal ethics," known
as the Law; it is a precept that we of all people can ignore only with
the most disastrous consequences to ourselves. I am reminded at this
point of the feeling which caused the Founding Fathers of our nation
to say in their Declaration of Independence that a decent respect for
the opinions of mankind impelled them to state the reasons for their
revolutionary action. Well, a decent respect for the opinions of others
must impel our jurisprudential investigator to engage in a personal
dialogue with the one who is the source of his information (in this
case the practicing attorney), to engage him in dialogue which
knows of no superior or inferior, and whose outcome instead of being
data is jurisprudence itself, lived through and saved up for the sake
of theory - the most convenient form of knowledge known.
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I repeat. I do not mean to make this aspect of our C's investigatory efforts applicable to behavioral science generally; that it should
be applicable pari passu, I have no doubt whatever. And of course
I should think it proper, if behavioral scientists should collaborate
with us in matters jurisprudential, that they should take as seriously
as we do the ideal of Equality, summed up in the phrase, "A decent
respect for the opinion of mankind." But whether this criterion is
sufficient to remove from behavioral research the stigma now attaching to it that it treats men as "things only," or as Kant said, "means
merely and not also as ends in themselves," is something the behavioral scientist himself must decide. All that I can be sure of is that
his methods will not succeed in jurisprudence until he makes every
honest effort (we just speak of motivation here, not result) to accord
his human subjects the dignity which every human being is apt at
any moment to insist upon as his Natural Right.
At this point, an argument from convenience intervenes, coming
from the mouth of the Reasonable Man. How in the name of God
or Science or anything else sacred can one go about collecting data
(average common results subject to the powerful equalizing force of
statistics) by means of this insane device of "dialogue." For religion,
yes. For intimate personal relations, also yes. But any such restriction as this would resolve, would it not, the whole of behavioral
science into a complex mess of confused human interactions and
convert the budding behavioral scientist into a gossip at the worst
or into a novelist-artist at best? In either event, would it not deprive
him of his living and strip him of his human dignity as a humble
though determined worker in the field of science?
O.K., I don't love statistics; but I don't hate it either. No more
powerful tool is known to modern science. And when it comes to
the leveling effect of generalization, we in law yield nothing to the
statisticians, as when we proclaim, "All men are born equal before
the law"; or, "No person shall ...."; or, "From and after the date
of the enactment of this act, all persons ....";or, "No one shall be
permitted, under penalty of ...." I also know the difference between
their generalizations and ours. Theirs are of ideal conceptual entities;
ours of real human beings. More than that, and more important,
their generalizations are Thought Constructs; ours are Feeling Relationships. Theirs are subject primarily to their Logic; ours are subject
paramountly to our Morality. Their individuals are Things; ours are
People, or since this is palpably not so for they too deal with People
and we also deal with Things, their objects are Thought Of and our
subjects are Felt About.
Well and good. But we have evaded the main point. If we say
we deal feelingly with subjects, why is our lumping together of all
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individuals into generalized categories for legal prescription any more
in accordance with human feeling than their generalizing of things
into Laws? (Note the very name for the scientists' generalizations.
We supplied them with the word Law.) Now we are at the nub.
At this point I must confess ignorance. I have gone as far as my
small store of wisdom will guide me. If I continue, it must be
stumblingly, into what is for me unmarked territory. Metaphor
aside, I know next to nothing about how feeling judgments get
generalized. I do not know much about the process that takes me
from saying that your children should not be discriminated against
in matters of education and my children should not be discriminated
against, to the grand generalization: No child should be discriminated
against. I do know that both individual judgment and general judgment are feeling judgments. As Kant put it, they would remain
"law," even though no single instance of them ever existed. And this
surely distinguishes feeling judgments from thought judgments. What
is good need not ever be true, just as what is true need not be either
good or bad- as in abstract thought.
And so I should say that nothing less than a complete revolution
in the nature of scientific inquiry is called for (a philosophical program if not a practical ideal) in order to make the scientist truly
humane. But conversely, our humanist cannot claim exemption from
the rigors of science. And in the law particularly, our methods of
scientific proof are so shockingly outmoded that we ourselves violate
a fundamental feeling prescription whenever we use our rickety
system of factfinding in a hotly contested case where the truth of the
competing claims matters materially.
In answer to the inescapable question, Is our Jurisprudential
Dialogue Model capable of gathering generalized data on jurisprudential questions?, I can only say that I believe it is, though I cannot
say how. We are just beginners at teaching one another the ways
by which Wisdom grows. Perhaps we shall have to be content with
a few negativities. Wisdom does not grow in the absence of feeling;
it does not grow in the absence of perception; it does not grow in an
aura of sentimentality, falsehood, indifference to what is factually so
and what is not. That is about as far as I can push this line of inquiry.
I conclude that our ideal C does not yet exist, but that we have taken
some small steps on the way to bringing him about.
2. The Purpose of the Investigation
Our Jurisprudential Dialogue Model requires us next to formulate as explicitly as we can the Purpose of our Investigation. We must
get agreement from our partners in the Dialogue on what we are
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after. I am well aware that many behavioral scientists would take
issue with me here. For them, the disclosure of their own motives,
when it would not vitiate their data, would in any event be irrelevant
and, they would say, as attested by general human experience could
be expected to cause the inquiry to degenerate into a personalistic
nonscientific exchange of views.
These are formidable objections. How shall we meet them? Only
a very pressing need on our part could induce us to depart so
radically from the ways which the behavioral scientists have labored
so hard to perfect in order to convert gossip into science.
I shall use the lawyer's prerogative of contradictory defenses or
attacks. I shall ask concerning the behavioral scientist on the question
of converting gossip into science: (1) Has he succeeded at all?; (2)
Has he succeeded only too well?
(1) I am not here concerned with the behavioral scientist's objective reports of observed human behaviors. These constitute an
immense reservoir of ordered experience in the ways human beings
act. Nothing that people do with a fair degree of regularity has
escaped the attention of these dedicated investigators. It is surprising,
however, to realize how little of this vast store of learning is available
to the law. This has been a source of severe disappointment to
interdisciplinarians many of whom, including most prominently
Roscoe Pound, confidently predicted more than half a century ago
that the day was close at hand when law would take its place among
the social sciences as itself a species of social science. Still, law apart,
the learning is indeed impressive. When however we come to our
main concern, the area of human motivation and the cause and cure
of conflict we find ourselves embroiled in the bitterest controversies
in the behavioral sciences over every fundamental, indeed every elemental, question. The psychology of human motivation is rent by
a massive schism. The depth psychologies battle the brain psychologies tooth and nail. It is not that an immense amount of side learning is not spun off. The issue for us is that no agreement emerges
on the nature of human motivation, and specifically nothing sure,
nothing agreed upon, on the nature of human conflict. Anthropology
has much to say on the behavior (including legal behavior) of primitives. The behavior of advanced civilized peoples is too much for it.
Sociology, in the opinion of some of its most thoughtful leaders, is
still struggling to perfect a method. Meanwhile it is fortunate when
it attains to the level of common sense.
Clinical practice in psychology tends to build up bureaucracies,
instinctively attaching themselves to power nodes in large-scale organizations in a manner reminiscent of the great religious and political
bureaucracies. Its chief method, "testing," is currently under severe
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fire, as the bureaucracies relying on the instruments of clinical practice react to consolidate their power positions in all the large institutions in which they are represented.
Economics as a learned discipline has never achieved a method
for checking its predictions. Its rationalistic learning, econometrics,
has no working rapport with the vast army of empirical practitioners
of the various economic arts and crafts. A self-perpetuating and selfvalidating bureaucracy has also blossomed forth from the curious
mixture of folklore and tautology calling itself economics. Meanwhile, Marxist economics and capitalistic economics enjoy a certain
precarious "coexistence" with erosions taking place on both sides as
bits and pieces of lore and learning are exchanged. No grand synthesis has emerged, however, and the economic behavior of mankind,
a most important sector of his life for law, is matter for polemic
instead of science.
In sum, despite a century of the most desperate straining to attain
to the level of science set by the natural sciences, the behavioral
disciplines have achieved nothing in the field of human behavior
comparable to the vast synthesis of the natural sciences respecting
their subject matters. And so I ask of the behavioral scientists, Have
you succeeded at all in being scientists, even in your own eyes?
(2) Turning now to the other horn of dilemma, there is a sense
in which the behavioral scientist has succeeded all too well in being
scientific. The major concern of any basic scientist is with method.
This is virtually all that occupies a logician or mathematician. It
has also been an overwhelming concern of the behavioral scientist.
But whereas logic and mathematics have provided the formal framework, the ordering principles, and the grand manipulative rules by
which the natural scientist works, these amazingly powerful servants
of science are not available to the behavioral scientist in anything
like the way they serve the natural sciences. There is a great hope
that decision theory and system science may remedy this defect. But
at present it is only a hope. The other important device in the
natural scientist's repertory is experiment. Together with the formal
ordering principles of logic and mathematics, experiment is the
invaluable tool for securing to the natural scientist access to the
world of experience. The behavioral scientist is denied this other
major element. He is forbidden to experiment with human behavior
in any way at all comparable to the natural scientist's freedom to
experiment with inanimate and animate nature, including even some
aspects of human life. Thus, deprived of the two parents of modem
scientific method, the behavioral scientist has been forced to invent
his own by spontaneous generation, so to speak. The result has been
a distressing gap between method and result. The behavioral scien-
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tist has succeeded only too well, it may be, with an inappropriate
method, generated on the model of the natural sciences, but not apt
for studying the kind of behavior he is interested in, namely, that
of men in action as whole living beings and as groups in their native
environment.
The question of disclosure of motivation and of frank and open
confrontation between investigator and subjects in behavioral science research is not to be disposed of in a few short paragraphs. But
the profession is coming to realize the seriousness of the deficiencies
in its attitude toward the human beings it treats as subjects through
the growing storm of outraged protests against its unfeeling procedures. The ultimate question to be faced is not whether and how
these should be circumvented, but whether they are not a warning
to be taken seriously as clear indications that the behavioral scientist
is being a bad scientist; that his methods must be reorganized even
in his own interests as a scientist.
At any rate, our Dialogue Model assumes that in our own interests as jurisprudentialists we intend to make frank and clear disclosure of our purposes first in our Model and then as modified by
the inquiry in ourselves. It remains to illustrate how the question
of Purposes can be formulated in advance of inquiry and, incidentally, to note how Purposes can be distinguished from Jurisprudential
Biases, the subject of the preceding section.
We might decide to try to find out, for example, whether our
subjects (practitioners) are consciously using what we would consider
to be Natural Law arguments in Civil Rights cases. Our Jurisprudential Bias might be that such arguments should (should not) be
consciously and explicitly formulated and urged upon the court.
Such Bias if it exists should be disclosed. Our Purpose however is
different. We now want to know what the practitioner in fact does.
And we tell him that that is what we want to know. This procedure
is based on the assumption that such knowledge on the part of the
subject does not vitiate the results, but that on the contrary the
deliberate suppression of disclosure of our Purpose would so contaminate our results as to make them untrustworthy.
3. The Schedule of Questions
Here the investigator is on his own. The Schedule of Questions
must be drawn up in very general terms. The explicit questions
would vary according to the responses of the subject. Yet the main
outlines of the inquiry could be set down and Leading Questions
could be devised in advance. The whole procedure should be informed with the spirit of a genuine dialogue, with the burden of
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carrying forward the Purpose of the investigation resting upon the
investigator. The interview is not open-ended. It is no fishing expedition, whose purpose is to beguile the subject into making disclosures
unknown to himself. The investigator yields nothing of frankness
and honestry to the supposed demands of a "scientific" inquiry in
which the motives of the investigator remain concealed, and his subjects are allowed to fall into traps of their own devising without the
active but with the full passive connivance of the investigator. The
following are a few fragments of imagined Questions, which, it must
be borne in mind, are raised only after Biases and Purposes are
disclosed:
Q. Do you believe that some offenses are basically so evil that
no safeguard of the criminal law, such as the prohibition against
ex post facto laws or reliance upon clear and explicit sovereign authority should prevail as a defense to such acts?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you kindly list the offenses you think meet this test?
If you list Genocide, do you think that a war between races can
never be legal? If you list war, are you prepared to abolish the socalled "laws of war"? Do you include murder, rape, looting, arson?
What principle do you use to bring your list to a stop? If you tried,
would this be an attempt to make jurisprudence?
A. No. It would be merely an individual opinion of a private
person.
A. I answer the previous question, No.
Q. Then what do you think of the idea of a universal common
law of crimes binding on all humanity without previous or indeed
without any enactment so that a court is justified in the individual
case before it in ruling that the offense charged falls within the
prohibition of such universal common law? This in effect would be
an extension of the method of the original English common law to
all peoples.
A. I don't like it.
Q. Do you nevertheless believe that a lawyer* who persuaded
a court to accept this view would be making jurisprudence?

Q. Do you find that the idea expressed in the phrase "the merits
of the- case," is a considerable force moving courts toward decision
especially in hotly contested cases or in cases in which the previous
"law" is either doubtful or else clearly two-sided?
A. Yes.
*Assodate Justice Jackson in the Nuremberg Trials.
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Q. Do you think lawyers today argue "the merits" more frankly
than they used to?
A. I don't know.
Q. If you found that in fact they do, do you believe that this
would mean that they are becoming conscious makers of jurisprudence?
A. Makers of law perhaps, but not makers of jurisprudence.
Q. Do you believe that judges legislate?
A. Of course Holmes, Cardozo and nowadays all sophisticated
judges accept their role as legislators.
Q. Do you also believe that lawyers legislate?
A. Hold on now. I didn't say that.
Q. I know you didn't, but do you believe it? And if so, give me
examples from your own experience.
A. But I'm inclined to think I don't believe it.
Q. O.K. But you do believe that lawyers give judges the wherewithal to work. That they decide what points to urge and that generally speaking judges accept some at least of these telling points?
And that if lawyer's don't raise these issues judges can't either? So,
explain this apparent inconsistency of yours.
Q. Do you believe in the natural law, that is, that some fundamental common substance of human nature is the basic foundation
of law?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you believe that this basic human substance, feeling, instinct is paramount over enacted law?
A. No.
Q. Explain the apparent contradiction.
Q. Would you venture an opinion of what the phrase, "the
merits of a case," really means?
A. It means the sympathies of judge and jury, their so-called gut
reactions. As in widows, orphans, mothers, the poor, the small, the
unprotected, the individual, and so on. If any of these is on your
side you have a plus.
Q. Do you think a lawyer is justified in explicitly asking a court
to take any of these things into account in his decision, assuming
of course that no previous rule of law has made such judicial recognition of the underprivileged status authoritative?
A. No.
Q. But if a lawyer did so argue, would he be attempting to make
jurisprudence?
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A. Law, not jurisprudence.
Q. But isn't the law's partiality to the underprivileged a fundamental tenet of the natural law? Of natural law jurisprudence?
A. I don't know.

Q. Do you believe a court should take into consideration the
so-called findings of social science about the social effects of rules of
law?
A. No.
Q. Do you think it was improper for the Supreme Court to take
into account the reports of sociologists on the effects of school racial
segregation?
A. Not improper, perhaps. Just useless. Or perhaps better still,
harmless.
Q. Do you think that counsel who urged these findings on the
court were making jurisprudence?
A. If so, they didn't make much of it.
Q. But if others follow their example would these all be instances
of lawyers making "sociological jurisprudence"?
A. A big name for a picayune matter.
Q. Do you ever use any such argument yourself in any of your
cases?
A. No.
Q. Do you know any lawyers that do?
A. It seems to me that counsel representing big social welfare
organizations are prone to do so.
Q. Is this proper conduct on their parts?
A. If the courts let them get away with it I suppose you have
to admit their right. I don't like to hamper counsel too much in
their choice of tactics. I would tend to let the courts rule on the
relevancy of testimony. They are certainly broadening that notion
considerably in recent times.

Q. Have you recently argued a point in the conflict of laws in
any of your cases?
A. I've never argued a point of conflict of laws.
Q. Have you ever had a case that could have involved a point
of conflict of laws?
A. I must have had. But I can't remember any.
Q. Do you know any lawyers that have argued such points
recently?
A. I can't think of any offhand.
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Q. But you are prepared to argue such a point if it comes up
squarely?
A. Of course.
Q. But it doesn't often come up?
A. Not to me.
Q. Isn't this strange for a country composed of fifty-two different
jurisdictions, all differing from one another in many important
respects?
A. It may be strange, but then again it may not be. Most law
is local.
Q. Would you say that by ignoring many opportunities for
raising conflicts questions lawyers as a group are making law, negative law, so to speak?*
A. You could say that.
Q. And if this should turn out to be a general feature of American
law, that the lawyers are making a very general rule of law?
A. O.K.
Q. And that if there are other broad areas of such negative lawmaking, we have a jurisprudential principle working?
A. That's all right with me. I have no objection. Only you
would have to extend it to the general practice of keeping all possible
disputes out of court and say that lawyers are engaged mainly in the
practice of nonlaw. Of course this means nonjudicial law. I guess
it in itself is law, if you want to look at it that way.
Q. Is this practice growing, in your opinion?
A. I don't know.

These fragments should acquaint the reader with two things.
In the first place it should warn him that while I have much to say
about how these jurisprudential inquiries ought to take place, I do
not know how to undertake them myself, judging by my questions.
Secondly, that the questions are not and should not be artfully

*In discussing the Babcock situation in his country, a Swedish jurist remarks
on the poverty of case law on the question of the rule of lex loci delecti in automobile cases. This law is virtually nonexistent. The learned commentator suggests that "practicing lawyers prefer a friendly settlement to a law suit in which
the outcome is difficult to predict." H. Eek, Babcock in Sweden, 54 CALIF. L. RE'.
1575 (1966). Actually, the outcome, as this writer himself intimates (if by outcome
we mean the rule of law), is not at all difficult to predict: The Swedish courts
he says have, whenever the opportunity presented, applied the lex loci delecti. But
lawyers don't litigate the point. The outcome on a generalized basis is not
only difficult but undesirable. So settlement practices grow up to circumvent the
largely rationalistic rule of the conflict of laws and its undesirable consequences.
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designed to be understood by the ordinary run of men, the "average"
practitioner, or the "reasonable" man. Much of the dialogue, if
not all of it in some cases, would consist in mutual attempts to make
sense of the Questions. And it could be expected in many cases that
the "subject" would be seen to take over the investigation in fact,
and not in mere appearance as frequently happens in the so-called
open-ended interview.
4. Recording of the Responses
Any mechanical Recording of Responses is so apt to introduce
such an intolerable bias into the Dialogue that the use of such devices
ought to be surrounded with unusual safeguards to prevent the
emergence of only stilted, carefully edited and blandly platitudinous
matter. This very important aspect of the Dialogue should be governed by whatever constraints suggest themselves to the good sense
of the investigator and the subject of the moment.
5. Summing Up What the Investigator Has Learned
This depends entirely upon the wit and ingenuity, the past
experience and present motivation, of the investigator, plus his ability
to know himself before and after an information-laden experience.
One encounter with a wise versatile experienced active practitioner
might result in an information overload. When assimilated, the
experience could be checked by repeated encounters, as many as one
could stand. What should emerge are overall intuitive guesses as to
what one has learned on the question whether or not the Lawyer
is an Emerging Force in Modern Jurisprudence. One may find one's
Jurisprudential Bias has been somewhat altered. One is more likely
to find that the Purpose of the investigation has undergone considerable modification. One may have learned how and how not to ask
questions, what questions are profitable, which ones are too distracting, and the like. One may have learned how to Record Responses
and Sum Up. Contrariwise, one may have learned rather to give up,
itself a valuable lesson in self-knowledge.
6. Changes in the Subject Matter of the Investigation
Assuming that one has wrung all the good for himself out of
the Dialogue experience, he may then turn to a consideration of
what the experience has meant so far as information on the Subject
Matter of the investigation is concerned. Here again intuition must
play the major role in helping to frame general overall propositions
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concerning the subject matter. At this point and not before the
investigator is in a position to frame Hypotheses for testing by the
formal methods of social science.
7. The Dialogue Model as a General Tool
We are now back where we started. If the hypotheses that
emerged from the preliminary Dialogue are to be turned over to
the formal methods of social science, what gain? Why go through
an elaborate process of dialogue in which the personality of the
subject is carefully respected only to emerge with Hypotheses to be
turned over to the impersonal and therefore unfeeling processes of
the behavioral scientists. If this did happen, it would be the worst
use to which our Hypotheses could be put. Still, they are better
Hypotheses than behavioral science is apt to get in any other way,
and that much would be a gain. More to be hoped for is that the
Jurisprudential Investigator could enter into a Dialogue with the
Behavioral Scientist for the purpose of showing him how superior
our Dialogue Model is to his intuitive one. This might result in
a genuine attempt on the part of the behavioral scientist to adapt
his method to the fundamental requirements of our Dialogue Model,
so that his formal testing, if it could survive such an experience,
would surely be a superior tool for behavioral investigation in general. That it would be a superior tool for investigations in jurisprudence and specifically for throwing light on the special problem of
the influence of the practitioner in modern jurisprudential matters
I have no doubt.
CONCLUSION

The net result of this inquiry can be stated very briefly. I do not
know whether the lawyer is an emerging force in modern jurisprudence but I believe that I have outlined a possible way to find out
whether this is so and (paradoxically) make it come about to a
small extent at the same time. Our inquiry has been twofold: how
to assure decent respect for the subject of a socio-legal experiment
and at the same time how to combine the generalized truth-seeking
of scientific inquiry with individuated feeling relationships between
investigator and subject. I strongly suspect that in all investigations
of human nature these two worthy objectives are really inseparable.
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